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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
WAYNE WARDLE, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 890372-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court 
by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals from the conviction and judgment of aggravated arson 
and insurance fraud in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. 
The Defendant was tried and convicted of aggravated arson and insurance 
fraud in a trial commenced on Tuesday, February 21, 1989. Verdict was rendered on 
Thursday, February 23, 1989. The district court entered judgment on the charge of 
aggravated arson as a second degree felony and the Defendant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years in the Utah State 
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Prison. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more 
than 15 years on the charge of insurance fraud, the sentences to run concurrently. The 
Defendant was then granted a stay of the execution of the prison sentences and placed 
on probation in the custody of the court and under supervision of the Department of Adult 
Parole and Probation for a period of 18 months. As a condition of probation, he was 
ordered to serve six months in the Sale Lake County Jail, pay a fine in the amount of 
$4,000.00, together with a 25% surcharge, and pay restitution in the amount of 
$15,900.00. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the Defendant denied due process of law as the result of unwarranted 
and prejudicial attacks upon his character and credibility? 
2. Was there prejudicial error in allowing the prosecutor to argue for the 
Defendant's conviction upon a theory which was not supported by the evidence? 
3. Was there prejudicial error in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine 
the Defendant regarding business dealings without buttressing his remarks with admissible 
extrinsic evidence? 
4. Did the State's expert testimony exceed the bounds of propriety, and if 
so, was the Defendant prejudiced thereby? 
5. Does the evidence support the verdict? 
6. Did the District Court err in failing to give the Defendant's proposed 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction in light of the language of the "reasonable 
doubt" instruction and the unique circumstances of this case? 
7. Was the Defendant denied effective assistance of counsel? 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
In October 1986, the Defendant was the proprietor of a small business 
engaged in the repair and maintenance of lawn sprinkler systems. The business was 
housed in an old home located at 395 West 5900 South in Murray, Utah. (T. 41, 73) 
On Monday, October 20,1986, the Defendant went to his place of business 
at approximately 6:45 a.m. He later told investigators he was there for the purpose of 
doing some miscellaneous bookkeeping. 
The Defendant left the premises at approximately 7:15 or 7:20 a.m. locking 
the door behind him. (T.74-75) The Defendant and his wife were the only persons in the 
possession of keys to the building. (T. 76) 
At 7:44 a.m. the local fire department was advised that the Defendant's 
building was burning. Fire fighters were at the location by 7:48 a.m. and the fire was 
under control by 7:59 a.m. (T. 22-25) 
After the fire had been extinguished, investigators from various public 
agencies and from the Defendant's insurance carrier, Ohio Casualty Insurance, examined 
the premises and attempted to determine the point of origin and the cause of the fire. 
Dean Larsen, assistant chief and fire marshall, Murray City Fire Department, 
was the first investigator on the scene. He testified that he located what he believed to 
be the point of origin of the fire near a desk in the northeast quadrant of the building. (T. 
42-48) He eventually located a soldering iron, the tip of which was lying on the floor and 
had burned through the carpet and the pad "into the subflooring with an indentation of 
approximately half an inch deep char into the floor." (T. 52) 
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Because it was obvious that the soldering iron was located near the point 
where the fire had originated and had been in contact with the floor for a substantial 
period of time the State's experts theorized that the instrument had been used as a timing 
device or had been intentionally planted as a "decoy."1 Consequently, a substantial part 
of their investigation would revolve around experimentation to determine whether or not 
the soldering iron could have started the fire and under what circumstances. 
Larsen opined that there may have been some type of flammable liquid used 
because he observed what he characterized as irregular burn patterns in the carpet 
indicating that for some reason the heat of the fire had remained low and to the floor in 
various locations. (T. 53-54) He also stated that it appeared that the soldering iron had 
been placed on the floor "and that something had been set on top of it so that the tip 
would stay in the position touching some combustible material, and some flammable 
materials put around it to accelerate it." (T. 64) Based upon these observations he 
concluded that the fire was intentionally set. 
Larson acquired a soldering iron similar to the one recovered at the scene 
of the fire. He dropped the soldering iron on the floor several times in order to determine 
whether or not the tip would come to rest in contact with the carpeting. He testified: "I 
wasn't able to do that. Every time it landed on the handle and not on the tip." (T. 66; See 
also T. 92, 127) 
. In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that "the Defendant had suggested to the fire 
fighters that maybe the soldering iron, which he claims to have been using earlier, had been plugged in and 
had somehow fallen off the desk, corner of the desk onto the floor, and maybe that's how the fire started." 
(T. 6) The opening statement goes on to suggest that the investigation into the soldering iron was made 
for the purpose of ruling out a hypothesis originally raised by the Defendant. (T. 6-9) However, the evidence 
would establish that it was the investigators who had concerns about the soldering iron and presented the 
issue to the Defendant for comment. (T. 98-99) 
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He then performed a test wherein he heated the soldering iron and placed 
paper on top of it to see if the paper would ignite. He testified that it would not ignite 
unless he first moistened the paper with lighter fluid. (T. 66-67) 
Finally, he left the soldering iron on for approximately four days to see if the 
handle would burn away or the instrument would fail for some other reason. It did not. 
CT.67) 
John Blundell testified that he examined the scene of the fire at Larsen's 
request. (J. 157) He independently located the same point of origin. (T. 159-160) He 
also felt that burn patterns in the carpet "had the appearance of the possibility of a 
flammable liquid being present." (T. 170) 
Blundell then spent some time ruling rule out an electrical malfunction as the 
cause of the fire. (T. 160-164) 
He testified that after concluding his examination of the scene of the fire: ". 
. . at least in my mind I wasn't certain that this was an intentionally set fire or an 
accidentally caused fire. So that's why the other two individuals spent a lot of time looking 
at soldering irons and conducting experiments associated with them." (T. 172) Blundell 
did not personally conduct any experiments involving the soldering irons nor was he 
present when any tests were conducted. (T. 167-168) Nevertheless he opined that the 
fire was intentionally set. (T. 173) 
Blundell conceded that in his opinion the soldering iron could have started 
the fire if a paper sack or some other combustible material had fallen onto the iron and 
encapsulated the heat. (T. 181) 
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James A. Ashby was retained by Ohio Casualty Insurance for the purpose 
of investigating the fire. (T. 207) His investigation lead him to conclude that the burn 
patterns in the carpet may have been attributable to radiant heat and not an indication of 
the use of any flammable liquid. (T. 210, 280) He opined that the irregular burn patterns 
in the carpet were likely caused by the presence of paper or the disintegration of the wall 
paneling. (T. 257, 283-284) As Ashby explained it: "Or in particular, I was worried about 
the paneling material, because it very quickly delaminates and peals off the wall and drops 
these burning embers in that area. And those burning embers can cause heavy carpet 
destruction as well." (T. 283) 
Ashby also conducted tests using a pencil type soldering iron. Ashby 
discovered that when dropped from a table the soldering iron usually came to rest with 
the tip down and in contact with the carpet. (T. 216-217, 219) 
Ashby then tested the soldering iron to determine whether or not it could 
actually ignite paper products. He summarized this experiment as follows: 
A. [BY MR. ASHBY] I knew from the bum patterns that the trash had 
been on top of the tip enough that it had pushed the tip down into the 
carpet or floor. So as I placed the sack of garbage on top, I did it in 
a way that would cover the tip and insulate the heat and speed the 
ignition process. When the paper would come in contact, it would be 
a few seconds before it would begin to smoke, and get a little trail of 
smoke. It would go for several minutes, smoking that trail of smoke -
-1 would compare to a cigarette ~ and then the smoke would slowly 
increase. In the first test after ten minutes, there was still nothing but 
smoke. I experimented by stepping on the bag, pushing it down. In 
so doing it had a bellows effect, pushing the smoke in and out of the 
bag. By pushing on it for a couple of minutes, I could actually force 
it to burst into a flame. But in the actual test, just pushing the trash 
onto the soldering iron I could never get an open flame. What I 
observed happening after leaving some of the tests for nearly two 
hours, is that it blackened out, slowly charred out without ever having 
a flame, charred out a space in the bottom of the sack around the 
soldering iron. And the soldering iron basically just sat, because 
there was very little oxygen and no fuel. And the smoke began to 
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dissipate, go away. 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Were you able to get any kind of a flame out of 
your experiments? 
A. I had to physically manipulate the sack, cause some type of 
oxygen exchange. That had to occur after ten minutes or so in order 
for there to be sufficient embers. 
(T. 220-221) 
In addition to the testimony of these three witnesses, the State produced 
evidence of the presence of a light range hydrocarbon in two of the five carpet samples 
taken from the scene of the fire. (J. 130) The State chemist testified that he detected the 
hydrocarbon by initially noting a "sweet odor" in two of the samples. (T. 131) Tests were 
then run on the gastromatography which indicated the presence of some kind of 
hydrocarbon although the chemist was unable to identify the substance or indicate in 
what quantity it was present. (T. 134) 
The Defendant testified and admitted that he had used a soldering iron three 
or four days before the fire. (T. 316-317, 329, 338) He denied having intentionally left the 
iron on and denied having intentionally set the fire. (T.324, 327-328) 
Sometime after the fire, the Defendant contacted a public adjuster who 
examined the premises and prepared a proof-of-loss statement for the Defendant's 
approval and signature. In December 1986 Defendant submitted a claim to Ohio Casualty 
in the amount of $24,984.75 and was ultimately paid $15,900.00 in settlement of his claim. 
(T. 143-145) 
In December 1987, almost 14 months after the fire, criminal charges were 
initiated against the Defendant. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant was denied due process of law as the result of unwarranted 
and prejudicial attacks upon his character and credibility. These attacks came in the form 
of cross-examination regarding the Defendant's financial circumstances and business 
dealings which was designed to impeach the Defendant's character and arouse suspicion 
of the jury. The Defendant was also prejudiced by the prosecutor's questions and 
argument relating to an alternative theory of liability on the charge of insurance fraud 
which was not supported by the State's evidence. 
The State's expert testimony exceeded the bounds of propriety in that it 
suggested that the experts had not only reached conclusions regarding the cause of the 
fire, but had considered the Defendant's statements and explanations and had concluded 
that the Defendant was in fact the culprit. 
The evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict and, given the unique 
circumstances of this case, the District Court erred in refusing to give the jury the 
Defendant's "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction. 
Finally, the Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel who 
failed to object to the introduction of improper expert testimony and the prosecutor's 
argument in support of a theory of liability which was unsupported by the evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AS A RESULT OF 
UNWARRANTED AND PREJUDICIAL ATTACKS UPON HIS 
CHARACTER AND CREDIBILITY. 
THE STATE INAPPROPRIATELY USED COUNT II OF THE 
INFORMATION AS A VEHICLE FOR PREJUDICING THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The State pursued Count II, Insurance Fraud, on alternative theories 
arguing, under the first, that: "If you conclude that this is an intentionally set fire, then filing 
the claim or proof of loss is a fraudulent act, all by itself. It doesn't require that we show 
the claim was padded or it was inflated."2 (7- 370) 
Alternatively the State argued a theory based upon padding or inflating the 
proof-of-loss statement. The evidence on the second theory is fairly summarized as 
follows: 
1. The proof of loss submitted by the Defendant was prepared by a public 
adjuster, a person who stands in the shoes of the insured and deals directly with the 
insurance company. (T. 143,150) 
2. The Defendant approved and signed the proof-of-loss statement although 
he had not directly participated in the preparation of the claim. The prosecutor's 
questioning along this line follows: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] So you're saying that both soldering irons 
were in your office? 
2 
. The issue of whether or not an offense of insurance fraud is made out under such a theory is briefed 
in Point Hi B, infra. 
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A. [BY MR. WARDLE] I'm sure there's probably half a dozen 
more. 
Q. How many soldering irons did you have? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Can you give us some kind of an idea? 
A. Probably half a dozen. 
Q. How many did you claim on the proof of loss? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Ten? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. 20? 
A. I don't know, sir. 
Q. 100? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. How do you know how many you had at the time of the fire then? 
A. I just know I had a few soldering irons. I'm sure we have some in our 
trucks, some downstairs. 
Q. Do you know how much property was destroyed in the fire? 
A. The only way that I know on this report is everything [the public 
adjustors] put on there is something they found substantially. 
Q. Somebody else found? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. How do you know that if the building is destroyed or damaged? 
A. I felt that I was involved enough, impressed enough with these guys 
that they were very accurate. 
Q. They just kind of went through the statement and said that looks like 
something I recognize, it was probably destroyed in the fire? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Did you do any verification to try and find out whether any of the 
items listed on the proof of loss were in fact destroyed in the fire? 
A. Everything in the building was destroyed in the fire. 
Q. I know, but it is possible some of the things you listed on the proof 
of loss may have been in the truck or the other building? 
A. No, because in order for them to put it on the list to begin it, it had to 
be there. Because what we did is went through everything, picked it up; if 
they didn't know what it was, they said what is this. So I was very 
impressed with their thoroughness. 
Q. Did you go through with them step by step and say these were item 
here in the office and these items were destroyed? 
A. Not step by step. 
Q. Then how do you know what was destroyed in the fire? 
A. Everything was in the building because they were fire damaged or 
smoke damaged. 
Q. How were you able to make up this list of items on your proof of loss 
in excess of $24,000? 
A. I didn't make it up. 
Q. I know that. But how do you know whether the items that were listed 
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were actually in the fire? 
A. Because I felt that they were accurate. 
Q. So it's just kind of a gut reaction on your part? 
A. I guess if that's what you call it. 
Q. You tell me. You're the one that signed the proof of loss. Where did 
you come up with the conclusion what was destroyed in the fire? 
A. I believe their information was accurate.3 
(T. 339-342) 
The foregoing constitutes the sum and substance of the State's evidence 
on the second theory of liability. No affirmative evidence was introduced which 
established that a single item listed in the proof-of-loss statement prepared by the public 
adjustors was not in fact lost or damaged in the fire. 
Supported by this evidence the prosecutor argues the Defendant's guilt on 
the charge of insurance fraud: 
He claims no knowledge about the proof of loss, which is troubling 
also. Here's a man who submits a claim to the insurance company 
for $24,900.00, signs it on the bottom saying it's true, correct and 
accurate, and yet on the stand yesterday he said: I don't really know 
too much about it, I hired a couple of public adjustors to take care 
of the situation. 
Well, that in reality is a cop-out by the Defendant to say I don't know 
what the policy is all about, I don't know what the proof of loss is all 
about, and yet I'm going to receive that money from the insurance 
company. He has to take the responsibility for something he signs 
and submits to the insurance company, whether he has somebody 
else actually help him do the inventory. It's a little troubling that 
yesterday on the stand, after submitting this claim, he can't even tell 
you how many soldering irons he had in the business, yet it's okay 
to submit the claim for all of his lost and destroyed property and yet 
he doesn't know what's there. How did he come up with these 
figures for the destroyed property in the fire if he doesn't know what's 
there? 
3 The proof-of-loss statement (State's Exhibit 20) is attached as an Addendum. A 
review of that document quickly demonstrates bad faith in pursuing this entire line of 
questioning. 
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A couple of other things. According to Mic Jensen who was the 
adjustor in this case, in his opinion that property was overinsured. 
He said the business was shutting down for the winter, most of the 
equipment had been moved out, it was an old and dilapidated 
building. He said frankly there was no incentive for the defendant to 
protect the property, yet he's got it insured for $102,000? Mic Jensen 
said based upon the estimates they had, it would only have cost 
$13,000 to replace this building, yet the Defendant has his $30,000 
worth of insurance on the building that burned in this case, files a 
claim for twenty-four nine and received 15.000?4 I was troubled a 
little bit by the fact the Defendant files a claim for twenty-four nine 
and says he's willing to accept $15,000. He said I was just happy to 
get anything out of it. But doesn't that suggest that maybe the claim 
was inflated; that maybe he didn't know how much was there or how 
much the claim was worth? I mean, if you file a claim for twenty-four 
nine and you're willing to accept 15,000, isn't that a little troubling in 
a case like this where the property has been destroyed? 
(T. 371-373) 
We will assume for the sake of argument that insurance fraud may be 
established under either one of these theories. Defendant concedes that the State may 
allege and prove alternative theories of liability involving a single criminal offense. 
However, it does not follow that the prosecutor may espouse and press a theory of 
liability which has no good faith basis for the sole purpose of discrediting and badgering 
the Defendant. 
A prosecution based solely on a theory that the proof-of-loss statement was 
padded, inflated or exaggerated would have been nothing less than malicious. The State 
cannot justify a prosecution on such a theory merely because the prosecution couples 
it with an alternative theory which may have more viability and uses the weaker theory 
only as a vehicle for broadening the attack upon the Defendant's character and credibility 
. The prosecutor's comments apparently refer to that portion of Mic Jensen's testimony appearing at 
T. I48-I49. 
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by innuendo and speculation. 
B 
DEFENDANT WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED BY UNWARRANTED 
ATTACKS RELATED TO HIS FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Over objection by Defendant's counsel, the prosecutor was allowed to 
question the Defendant regarding a host of issues related to his financial circumstances. 
(T. 342-345, 354-355) Defendant concedes that in a case involving arson with intent to 
defraud an insurer the prosecution may be allowed certain latitude in developing the 
defendant's motive through questions regarding his financial status, provided that the 
inquiry appears to have been made in good faith. See People v. Folsom. 34 Cal.Rptr. 
148 (1963). 
The prosecutor's cross-examination regarding "financial interest" follows: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Do you have any judgments against you? 
A. [BY MR. WARDLE] I don't believe --
MR. METOS: I'll object. I don't see the relevance of this. 
MR. JONES: Goes to financial interest, your honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I'm not aware I do. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Did you have one involving Western General 
Dairies? 
A. I do or did. 
Q. Did you have a garnishment against your accounts? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you have a judgment involving a man named Gary Gavin? 
A. No. 
Q. A lawsuit with him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you owe him money? 
A. I don't know who Gary Gavin is. 
Q. Did you ever have any employees that sued you during that time? 
A. I'm sure we have. 
Q. Did you change the name of your business about the time of the 
fire? 
A. We still have not completed the name change. It's in the -- that 
process will take a few more years. 
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Q. Did you start to change the name about the time of the fire? 
A. I think the year before. 
Q. Why were you changing the name? 
A. We were incorporating 
Q. Why did you change the name? 
A. Because we were incorporating. 
Q. Did it have anything to do with lawsuits pending against you? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. Did you change the owner of the business? 
A. I'm still the primary owner. 
Q. Did you change the owner and put your wife as the owner? 
A. She's the president of the corporation. I'm a major stockholder. 
Q. She wasn't before the fire, was she? 
A. She still was. I'm still dba. 
Q. Did you change your checking account about the time of the fire? 
A. I changed it--which, on the Brighton? 
Q. Did you change it to Valley Bank? 
A. It still is. 
Q. At the time of the fire how much money did you have in your 
accounts at Valley Bank? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. You didn't have anything, did you? 
A. I have to have something, otherwise they close it. 
Q. Had you transferred all of the money out of the Valley Bank 
account? 
A. I don't think we transferred any money. 
Q. Just used everything up that was in that account? 
A. Yeah, there was no point in leaving money in there. 
Q. And again that didn't have anything to do with lawsuits or any 
possible litigation? 
A. No. 
* * • 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Mr. Wardle, I'm a little confused. Are you telling the jury you didn't 
know you had a judgment? 
A. [BY MR. WARDLE] The way you asked the question, I don't know 
what you're asking. 
Q. I'm asking you, sir, did you ever have any judgments against you 
in a court of law? 
A. I think I've had probably five or six judgments against me through 
my history. 
Q. Starting when? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. And ending when? 
A. I don't have any current. 
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Q. Did you have any in '86? 
A. I don't recall. I believe that I had a couple. 
Q. Well, which judgments do you recall having? 
A. The one that you mentioned, Western General Dairies for $762.00. 
They got a judgment by default and we did pay that. That was paid 
and satisfied at that time, I'm sure, because we paid it the day after 
we found out about it. And there was one for Conlee Company for 
Five or $6,000, for a supply bill we had paid, but Cindy down there 
got a little overzealous. And Frank did apologize, but I believe that's 
still on my record, because we simply haven't bothered to take it off. 
Q. So at the time of the fire did you have that judgment pending? 
A. No, it was never a judgment. It was already paid and satisfied, but 
it was never entered. 
Q. How many times have you been sued for civil judgments? 
MR. METOS: I'll object. We need to be more specific. If he 
had civil judgments pending and outstanding at the time, that may 
establish a motive. But if he had civil judgments in the past and 
satisfied them so what? 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Did you have any civil judgments pending or in 
effect at the time of this fire? 
A. I don't recall. 
MR. JONES: That's all. 
(T. 342-345; 354-355) 
When the court invited rebuttal the prosecutor declined. (T. 356) The State 
had succeeded in suggesting to the jury that (1) the Defendant had been sued civilly on 
numerous occasions; (2) that his bank accounts had been garnished; (3) that he had 
changed his business name for the purpose of defrauding creditors; (4) that he had 
changed his bank account for similar purposes; and (5) that he had incorporated his 
business and designated his wife as president of the newly-formed corporation for the 
purpose of avoiding his creditors. 
Neither the Defendant's answers nor any rebuttal offered by the prosecutor 
suggests a good faith basis for these inquiries. If inquiry regarding the Defendant's 
financial situation was, as the prosecutor argued, relevant for the purpose of establishing 
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motive, then the subject would not have been considered collateral and extrinsic evidence 
could have been properly admitted on rebuttal. 
The State's case was based entirely upon circumstance. The prejudicial 
effect of these attacks is amplified by the fact that the Defendant's credibility was not only 
the cornerstone of his defense, it was its sum and substance. 
In State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986), the defendant in a burglary 
prosecution was questioned about prior felony convictions. He admitted three 
convictions, but questioning about additional felony convictions drew repeated denials. 
In reversing the conviction, the Utah Supreme Court observed: 
On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution's reference to other 
unproven felonies prejudiced his case since his defense was based 
solely on his credibility. He claims that the prosecutor's suggestions 
(by inference) that he was not telling the truth about his felony 
convictions would cause the jury to doubt his denial of the present 
charge. The concern is well-founded. Other courts have held that 
where a witness denies prior convictions, questioning on that subject 
is disallowed unless the questioner is prepared to present extrinsic 
proof of the convictions. The rule was explained in Kizer v. State. 67 
Okl.Cr. 16, 93 P.2d 58 (1939), as follows: 
[l]mpeaching questions should not be propounded to 
a witness unless they are based upon facts that the 
interrogator intends to present in refutation of adverse 
answering of questions propounded; such line of 
questioning should be done in good faith, and not for 
the purpose of prejudicing and arousing suspicion of 
the jury against the defendant. 
93 P.2d at 88. 
In the instant case, the trial court denied the motion for mistrial in 
finding that the prosecutor had acted in good faith. This finding was 
in error, however, in view of the prosecutor's failure to buttress his 
references to defendant's convictions with admissible extrinsic 
evidence (such as a certified copy of the conviction), [citation 
omitted]. 
722 P.2d at 769-770. 
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In State v. Kramp. 651 P.2d 614 (Mont. 1982), the Montana Supreme Court 
reversed a felony theft conviction holding that the prosecutor's cross-examination of a 
defense character witness had denied the defendant a fair trial. The court stated: 
Here the prosecution's case against the defendant rests upon 
circumstantial evidence. Imputing to him by indirection a criminal 
record, and one related to traits of character not involved in the 
specific offense for which the defendant was charged here, was 
certainly substantial, [citation omitted] This means that the 
defendant did not receive a fair trial, and upon that ground we must 
reverse, [citation omitted] 
651 P.2d at 619. 
In Davis v. State. 413 P.2d 920 (Okl.Cr. 1966), the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant's grand larceny conviction, stating: 
The first proposition stated is: "The defendant was denied a fair and 
impartial trial because of improper and prejudicial misconduct of the 
county attorney"; and the second is stated as: "Error of the court in 
permitting the introduction of incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and 
improper evidence which was materially and fundamentally prejudicial 
to the rights of defendant." 
* * * 
We believe, in this case, the defendant did not receive a trial entirely 
without prejudice. We do not say the prejudice was intentional, but 
whether intentional or not, it is present in the record before this Court. 
When the county attorney was permitted to go into collateral matters 
concerning certain bank deposits, which he contended were made 
by the defendant, without offering any proof of his contentions, he left 
insinuations and implications with the jury that the funds deposited 
were illegally acquired. 
* * * 
However, notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution has great 
latitude in cross-examination, there are limits to which it is permitted 
to go. And, when it clearly appears that the questions asked create 
undue prejudice in the minds of the jury, whether intentional or not, 
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then the cross-examination has exceeded the limits of proper cross-
examination. This is particularly true when no proof appears in the 
record to support the nature of the cross-examination. 
During the county attorney's cross-examination of the defendant, 
defendant denied certain alleged deposits. At no time did the county 
attorney offer any proof to overcome defendant's denials. 
* * * 
We are of the opinion that the county attorney's remarks were 
prejudicial to defendant's fundamental rights, and therefore failure to 
object did not waive the objection. 
413 P.2d at 923-294. 
In the instant case the Defendant was asked if he owed money to a 
gentlemen by the name of Gary Gavin. He denied it. He was asked whether or not he 
had engaged in litigation with Gavin. He denied it. He was asked whether or not his 
business name was changed as a result of pending lawsuits. He denied it. He was 
asked if he had redistributed the ownership of his business with similar motives. He 
denied it. He was asked if he had changed banks and checking accounts. He denied 
any impropriety. He was asked whether or not any such changes had "anything to do 
with lawsuits or any possible litigation." He denied it. 
The prosecutor had succeeded in painting the Defendant as dishonest in his 
business dealings and in his denial of the prosecutor's specific questions for which the 
jury would surely assume there existed a good faith basis. The lack of good faith is 
demonstrated by the prosecutor's failure to buttress his remarks with admissible extrinsic 
evidence. See State v. Peterson, supra: see also, Tomarchio v. State. 99 Nev. 572, 665 
P.2d 804 (1983). 
The combined effect of this line of questioning together with the innuendo 
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of padding and exaggerating the proof of loss was obviously prejudicial to the Defendant 
and require reversal of his conviction and a new trial. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION WAS BASED UPON IMPROPER 
"EXPERT'TESTIMONY, THE ADMISSION OF WHICH CONSTITUTES 
MANIFEST ERROR. 
The opinions of the State's experts exceeded the bounds of propriety and 
were manifestly prejudicial. 
The State's first expert witness was Dean Larsen. He testified: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Based upon your investigation in this case and 
the interviews, your examination of the scene, what is your theory of 
the case, how did this fire start? 
A. [BY MR. LARSEN] My opinion is that the soldering iron was put 
there prior to the actual fire itself; that it smoldered for quite sometime 
without getting in complete combustion or the fire stage; that it was 
discovered by Mr. Wardle and that he accelerated it, put some type 
of flammable liquid on it to get it started and then left. 
(T. 121) 
James A. Ashby testified: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Based upon your examination there at the scene 
and the testing you did, were you able to form some kind of a theory 
as to what happened here? 
A. [BY MR. ASHBY] Yes, I do have a theory. 
Q. What is that? 
A. I believe that the soldering iron was placed on the floor with a bag 
of garbage, some days prior to the fire, probably on Thursday; that 
it was left as a timing device; that after several days when an open 
flame had erupted; Mr. Wardle went back in to investigate as to why, 
found that his garbage was charred out in a cavern, the same as 
my tests, and the only burning that had continued is that of the top 
of the soldering iron slowly into the floor; and at that time, either used 
a match or some such device to ignite the fire or may have stamped 
19 
on the garbage several times, creating the billowing effect which 
created the open flame and then left. 
(T. 228) 
In later summarizing the basis of his opinion, Ashby testified: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Mr. Ashby, was there one factor that you would 
pinpoint in this case that led you to the conclusion that this was an 
intentionally set fire? 
A. [BY MR. ASHBY] I think the timing of being there and the fact that 
story did just not add up with the physical evidence as to what would 
be in the house; specifically his coming back to the house shortly 
before the fire, early that morning. Had the soldering iron been in 
place from the Thursday before, as some of the physical evidence 
would tend to indicate, I believe that it would have been very 
noticeable, the smoke, the odor, something, something should have 
told Mr. Wardle that things were amiss. And if in fact the soldering 
iron had fallen off but somehow not landed on the carpeting, and we 
ignore the fact it burned so deep into the floor and come back and 
say somehow it fell into a crack there and that's the reason it's so 
deep, then we have to come up with an explanation that the soldering 
iron could cause open flaming combustion of the paper within a 
minute or two. And I found nothing in the research or my 
experimentation that would indicate that the soldering iron can create 
an open flame that fast. 
* * * 
Q. [BY MR. METOS] If he had said to you on that morning, I notice 
something funny but didn't pay any attention to it, would that change 
your opinion at all? 
A. [BY MR. ASHBY] I would want to know more about what was 
funny. 
Q. Something that smelled like smoke? 
A. Then I would be most curious about visible smoke or why he didn't 
investigate further. 
(T. 284-285, 290) 
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The State's other expert, John Blundell, summarized the consensus of the 
experts' opinions: ". . . basically what we're saying is that the Defendant lied about what 
he found when he walked in the building that morning because smoke would have been 
present." (T. 177) 
In summary, the State's experts were allowed to not only testify that in their 
opinion the fire had been started intentionally, they were allowed to state their "expert" 
opinion that the Defendant was the culprit and speculate upon how he initially intended 
to accomplish the arson and what measures he took when the soldering iron failed to 
ignite any flammable materials. Indeed, Ashby's and Blundell's testimony was in 
substance based principally upon the fact that they did not believe the Defendant when 
he stated that he had not noticed anything unusual in the building immediately prior to the 
fire and their belief that smoke or odors would have been perceptible at that time. 
In some cases an intelligent evaluation of the facts is difficult, if not 
impossible, without the application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge. The rules of evidence accordingly recognize that an expert called as a 
witness may properly educate the trier of fact concerning the scientific or other principles 
relevant to the determination of the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply the principles 
to the facts as they may find them. The rules also recognize that at times it may be 
necessary for the expert to take the further step of suggesting the inference which should 
be drawn from applying the specialized knowledge to the facts. Accordingly he may 
present his opinion in response to a direct or hypothetical question. See generally 
Advisory Committee's note to Federal Rule 702. 
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Until about forty years ago, a very substantial number of courts had 
announced the general doctrine that witnesses would not be permitted to give their 
opinions or conclusions upon an ultimate fact in issue. United States v. Spauldino. 293 
U.S. 498, 506 (1935); and see 7 N.C.LRev. 320 (1928) 16 ft 180 (1938); 26 la.LRev. 819 
(1941). 
McCormick on Evidence explains: 
The reason was sometimes given that such testimony "usurps the 
function" or "invades the province" of the jury. Obviously these 
expressions were intended to be taken literally, but merely to suggest 
the danger that the jury might forgo independent analysis of the facts 
and bow too readily to the opinion of an expert or otherwise influential 
witness. 
McCormick, McCormick on Evidence Section 12 at 30 (E. Geary, 3d ed. 1984). 
The ultimate issue rule has been in a state of constant erosion and Rule 
704, Utah Rules of Evidence, now provides: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible 
is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact. 
However, even under the most liberal rules, certain opinions should be 
excluded on the grounds that their value is outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury". See Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.5 
5
. The Advisory Committee's note to Federal Rule 704 reads in part as follows: 
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all 
opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, 
and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These 
provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which merely 
tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an 
earlier day. 
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A witness' statement which amounts to no more than an expression of his 
belief as to how the case should be decided should be excluded for "to receive it would 
tend to suggest that the judge and jury may shift responsibility for decision to the 
witnesses . . ." McCormick at 30. 
In the recent case of State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction based upon the erroneous 
and prejudicial admission of expert testimony, commented: "We remain wary of the 
potential of such evidence to distort the fact-finding process by reason of its superficial 
plausibility and its potential for inducing fact finders to accept expert' judgments on critical 
issues rather than making their own." 775 P.2d at 399. 
In the instant case, the prejudice created by the "expert" testimony was 
compounded by the prosecutor's argument: 
To me the case is simply a question of: Do you believe those three 
arson investigators when they reached the conclusion that this was 
an intentionally set fire, or do you believe the Defendant when he says 
it was an accident? 
* * * 
[The State's expert witnesses] spent a considerable amount of time 
investigating the case. They heard from the Defendant. They heard 
his explanation. Thev wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt. 
They didn't go with any preconceived notions or ideas when they 
went to investigate the fire. They simply wanted to know what 
happened. They wanted to investigate and reach a conclusion. And 
after all was said and done the conclusion of these investigators was 
that this was an intentionally set fire. [Emphasis Added] 
(T. 359-360, 369) 
The argument suggests that the expert witnesses were "super jurors" who 
heard the case unhampered by the niceties of the courtroom. 'They heard from the 
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Defendant," considered "his explanation," and concluded that he had "lied" about his 
observations in the building on the morning of the fire and that he had intentionally set his 
building on fire. "They wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt." 
The experts had done more than formulate opinions regarding the origin of 
the fire-they had tried and convicted Wayne Wardle. The State presented, as evidence, 
its experts' theories of the Defendant's guilt. While not objectionable as argument, they 
were theories, not evidence. 
It is difficult to conceive a scenario which more fully suggests to the jury that 
it may "forego independent analysis of the facts" and decide the case on the single issue 
suggested by the prosecutor in argument: 
Do you believe these three arson investigators when they reached the 
conclusion that this was an intentionally set fire, or do you believe the 
defendant when he says it was an accident? 
Error is manifest when it is made to appear "on the face of the record and 
to the manifest prejudice of the accused . . . " State v. Cobo. 90 Utah 89, 102, 60 P.2d 
952, 958 (1936). 
In the instant case the prejudice to the Defendant is manifest by the fact that 
the experts are his only accusers and the State's entire case involves around their 
opinions. The error is plain, the prejudice is manifest. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENTTO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS. 
A 
ARSON 
The State's entire arson case is based upon the testimony of Larsen, 
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Blundell, and Ashby. 
The State's own experts disagreed on two of the most significant factors in 
determining whether or not the fire had been intentionally set, to wit: (1) The likelihood 
that the tip of the soldering iron would remain in contact with the carpet if the iron were 
dropped from a desk, and (2) whether or not burn patterns in the carpet were indicative 
of the use of flammable liquids. 
The only thing the investigators could agree on was that the Defendant had 
lied when he denied having seen or smelled anything unusual when he entered the 
building a few minutes before the fire began. None of the experts conducted a single 
test which would demonstrate the characteristics of any gases given off by heating 
particle board flooring to a temperature which would allow it to produce an ember. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the physical evidence indicated 
that the soldering iron had been in contact with and had burned into the particle board 
flooring, the investigators concentrated on experimentation which examined the likelihood 
that the tip of the soldering iron itself would ignite paper within a relatively short period of 
time. None of the experiments related to the ignition of paper coming into contact with 
an ember in the particle board which had been produced by the soldering iron over a 
substantial period of time. 
The State's evidence is contradictory and speculative and fails to exclude 
reasonable hypotheses which are consistent with the Defendant's innocence. 
B 
INSURANCE FRAUD 
Under the State's theory of the case, the claim of insurance fraud could be 
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made out by demonstrating that the Defendant had intentionally set the fire and then filed 
an insurance claim. (T. 370) The State suggests that filing the claim under those 
circumstances is a fraudulent act even if the proof-of-loss statement has not been 
padded, inflated, or exaggerated. 
The Defendant concedes that a charge of insurance fraud may be made out 
by establishing that compensation was claimed for items which had not in fact been 
damaged or lost in the casualty. See State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 1986). 
In Nickles. a husband and wife were charged with arson in the burning of 
their home and insurance fraud in making a claim for its destruction and the loss of its 
contents. Both were convicted on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants had in fact 
conspired to burn the home. In addressing the defendants' contention that the evidence 
did not sustain a conviction of insurance fraud, the Court carefully reviewed the evidence 
which the State had produced for the purpose of establishing the fact that the defendants' 
claim had included items which had not been destroyed in the fire. The Supreme Court 
concluded: 
Even if the jury had chosen to disbelieve the testimony of fire 
investigators as to items they were unable to locate or identify in the 
rubble, the undisputed evidence that the defendants claimed a 
nonexistent burglar alarm system and intercom system on their proof-
of-loss statement is sufficient evidence to support the verdict finding 
defendants guilty of insurance fraud. 
728 P.2d at 128. 
The opinion nowhere suggests that proof of the arson followed by the 
submission of a claim for the resulting losses will, in and of itself, support a charge of 
insurance fraud. 
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POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANTS PROPOSED "REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE 
HYPOTHESIS" INSTRUCTION. 
At trial, counsel proposed a jury instruction which would have advised the 
jury that in a circumstantial evidence case the evidence must exclude "every reasonable 
hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the defendant". (R. 66) When the trial court 
failed to give this instruction exception was taken. (T. 407) 
Counsel is aware of the long line of Utah decisions holding that the trial 
court need not give a "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction so long as the jury 
is properly instructed regarding "reasonable doubt". See State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1982) (citing numerous cases). 
The Defendant does not claim personal knowledge of all of the 
circumstances which led to the fire. He was left to answer the charges by declaring his 
innocence and proposing possible explanations which incorporated the circumstances as 
he understood them to be. (T. 346-347) 
Instruction No. 3 advised the jury: "A reasonable doubt must be a real, 
substantial doubt and not one that is merely possible or imaginary." [Emphasis Added] 
(R. 93) 
It was error to refuse to give the proposed "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis" instruction where the "reasonable doubt" instruction suggested the 
inadequacy of a defense based upon "possible" explanations for the origin of the fire. 
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POINT V 
DEFENDANTWAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OFCOUNSEL 
IN VIOLATION OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED HIM UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States and Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes the right to effective assistance of 
counsel as a constitutional mandate. In State v. McNicol. 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976) 
the Court stated: 
[T]he right of the accused to have counsel is not satisfied by a sham 
or pretense of an appearance in the record of an attorney who 
manifests no real concern about the interests of the accused. He is 
entitled to the assistance of a competent member of the Bar, who 
shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the 
accused and presents such defenses as are available under the law 
and consistent with the ethics of the profession. 
Recently the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the standard 
of effective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), the Court stated: 
"a defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show both that 
his or her counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and 
'that a reasonable probability exists that except for the ineffective counsel, the result 
would have been different.'" 770 P.2d at 118 (citing State v. Loveli. 758 P.2d 909, 913 
(Utah 1988)). The United States Supreme Court has defined a reasonable probability as 
one which is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland. 688 U.S. at 
694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 
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The Defendant contends that trial counsel was remiss in failing to object to 
the prosecutor's argument in support of a theory of guilt based upon padding, inflating 
or exaggerating the Defendant's proof-of-loss statement. Defendant contends that this 
theory of liability was clearly unsupported by the evidence and that trial counsel should 
have taken exception to any argument advanced in support thereof and should have 
asked the trial court to advise the jury that they could not return a verdict of guilty under 
such a theory. See Point I A, supra. 
The Defendant further contends that trial counsel was remiss in allowing the 
State to introduce, without objection, improper opinion evidence which was clearly 
prejudicial to the Defendant. See Point II, supra. 
In State v. Colonna. 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988), the defendant was 
convicted of aggravated robbery. His principal points on appeal were based upon 
entrapment and police misconduct. The direct testimony in the case clearly established 
the defendant's involvement in the crime and his use of a firearm in the course of its 
commission. Arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant cited defense counsel's failure to object or move for a mistrial following 
prejudicial comments made in the course of the undercover officer's testimony. He cited 
three isolated occasions where objectionable testimony had crept in, none of which 
appeared to have been responsive to or elicited by the prosecutor's line of questioning. 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that there existed a legal basis for objection to all of 
the comments which the defendant had identified, but went on to state: 
However, taking these comments as a whole, they do not necessarily 
constitute harmful error, it is conceivable that counsel made a 
deliberate and wise tactical choice in not focusing jury attention to 
them by objecting. 
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Although the comments made by [the undercover officer] were 
problematic, they were brief and isolated. Furthermore, they were not 
so inflammatory as to change the outcome of the trial. The proper 
and admissible testimony in this trial about illicit drug use and the 
defendant's behavior with his gun, none of which was controverted, 
was extensive and was so much more serious than the objectionable 
testimony that it is hard to see how the improper testimony could 
have done such harm. 
766 P.2d at 1067. 
In the instant case, counsel's failure to object can hardly be attributed to an 
overall trial strategy or a tactical decision made in an effort to avoid focusing jury attention 
to "brief and isolated" comments. 
In summary, the objectionable opinion evidence provided the very 
foundation of the circumstantial evidence case against the Defendant, and the 
objectionable argument, the vehicle for assailing the basis of his entire defense -- his 
credibility. 
The magnitude of these errors is surely sufficient to undermine any 
confidence this Court would have in the outcome of a trial free of such error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant was denied due process of law as the result of unwarranted 
and prejudicial attacks upon his character and credibility. Furthermore, he was 
prejudiced by expert testimony which exceeded the bounds of propriety suggesting that 
the experts had not only reached conclusions regarding the cause of the fire, but had 
considered the Defendant's statements and explanations and had concluded that the 
Defendant was in fact the culprit. 
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The Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to 
the District Court for a new trial. 
DATED this VpD day of November, 1989. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this ^>Q day of November, 1989, I did 
personally mail four copies of the above and foregoing Brief to the Utah Attorney General 
at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
31 
SWORN STATEMENT IN PROOF OF LOSS 
Structure Only 
POLICY NUMBER: XFO 3456 6 AMOUNT OF POLICY AT TIME OF LOSS: $ 102.000.00 Basic 
DATE ISSUED: 7/22/06 DATE EXPIRES: 7 /22/87 
To the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company: 
At the time of loss, by the above Indicated policy of Insurance you Insured Wayne Wardle dba A- l 
Maintenance (properly A-t Sprinklers Inc.) against loss by Fire and Lightning, Extended 
Coverage, VMM. AH Risk to the property described according to the terms and conditions of the 
said policy and all forms, endorsements, transfers and assignments attached thereto. 
1. Time and Origin: A fire loss occurred about the hour of 7:15 o'clock A.M., on the 20th 
day of October. 1966. The cause and origin of the said loss were: unknown. 
2. Occupancy: The building described, or containing the property described, was occupied at the 
time of the loss as follows: Landscape Contractor office. 
3 . Title and Interest: At the time of the loss the Interest of your Insured In the property 
descried therein was owner. No other person or persons had any Interest therein or incumbrace 
thereon, except: Dwlght Dalley, Mortgagee. 
4. Changes: Since the said policy was Issued there has been no assignment thereof, or change of 
Interest, use, occupancy, possession, location or exposure of the property described, except: loss 
payable endorsement to Insurance Claims Consultants. 
5. Total Insurance: The total amount of Insurance upon the property described by this policy was, 
at the time of loss: $30,000.00 
6. The Actual Cash Value of said property at the time of loss was $33,000.00 
7. The Whole Loss and damage was $24,984.75 
8. The Amount Claimed under the above numbered policy is $24,984.75 
The said loss did not originate by any act, design or procurement of the part of the insured or this 
affiant; nothing has been done by or with the privity or consent of the Insured or this affiant to violate 
the conditions of the policy, or render It void; this is not a release of all claims; any other information 
that may be reasonably required will be furnished and considered a part of this proof; any other claims 
made pertaining to this loss will not be a part of this proof; the preparation and furnishing of this proof 
by the Insured or this affiant, Is not a waiver of any rights of said Insured or any of the conditions of 
this policy. 
State of tft*4 /fJ^j Jc^Lt/Z £>£//- /fv /$**£«**«** <&-
County «rS*^A*Ak- T ^ W M £uU4« ^ *£& ljoL*£ x4 . 
Subscribed and swbrruto before me this fo day of Pece+*f6c^ \9JL£. 
/ ^ / ^^jO^ZC^ ( « < U - < - _ Mn> w y Public 
INSURANCE CLAIMS CONSULTANTS 
275 E. 200 S. 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
(801) 532 
SUITE 10B 
UTAH 84111 
-1422 
Estimate -for; A-l SPRINKLERS INC. 
395 WEST 5900 SOUTH 
HURRAY, UTAH 84107 
(WAYNE WARDLE) 11/24/86 
OFFICE (21.25x12x8) W/ Offset (7x15.58) 
364 SF R/R Sub-Floor 
364 SF R/R part, board under1 ayment 
42 SY R/R Custom carpet 
42 SY R/R Padding 
237 SF Install 2 X 4 studded wall 
640 SF R/R Sheetrock 1/2 in. 
360 SF lath S« plaster 
1 EA R/R Shelving 
168 SF R/R Wallcovering 
19 SF R/R double hung windows 
1 EA R/R H/C door unit 
492 SF Remove batt insulation 
492 SF Install exterior wall insulation 
12 EA R/R Duplex outlets 
1 EA Install thermostats 
1 EA Swamp cooler 
1 EA Travis rod 
1 EA Levelor blinds 
1 EA R/R Bulletin board 
1 R/R Support beam 
364 SF R/R Sheetrock ceiling 
364 SF Tape & Float S/R ceiling 
364 SF Seal coat ceiling 
364 SF Paint Ceiling 
112 SF R/R Suspended ceiling 
184 LF Remove ceiling joist 
184 LF Install 2 X 6 ceiling joist 
1 EA R/R Electric panel box 
17 EA R/R Circuit breakers 
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195. 
495. 
48. 
135. 
45. 
498, 
*"> 
O 
1 
400 
45 
60 
50 
00 
/ rr 6vJ 
85 
50 
00 
50 
00 
00 
24 
65 
, 00 
, 00 
,00 
,00 
, 00 
. 00 
. 00 
.90 
.40 
-rtr 
a ->xJ 
.45 
a 00 
. 65 
.30 
. 00 
.00 
345.80 
21B.40 
987.00 
126.00 
391.05 
544.00 
900.OO 
60. OO 
252.00 
266,, 00 
85.00 
118.08 
319.80 
240.00 
195.00 
495.OO 
48.00 
135.00 
45.00 
498.00 
327.60 
145.60 
127.40 
163.80 
224.OO 
4B7.60 
239.20 
400.OO 
765.00 
Room ft 1 cont. (21.25x12x8) W/ Offset (7x15.58) 
1 EA R/R Porch light 
3 EA R/R Heating vents 
45 .00 
23 .00 
45 .00 
69 .00 
WORl SHQF (11. 5*145,8) 
19 SY R/R Vinyl -floor covering 
104 SF R/R Sheetrock 1/2 in. 
Clean walls 400 
400 
400 
1 
161 
161 
161 
161 
1 A1 
SF 
SF 
SF 
EA 
EA 
EA 
Seal coat walls 
Paint walls 
R/R wood window unit 
R/R Panel door unit 
Travis rod 
SF R/R Sheetrock ceiling 
SF lath Z< plaster 
SF Tape ?< Float S/R ceiling 
SF Texture ceiling 
SF Seal coat ceiling 
161 SF Paint Ceiling 
161 SF Remove batt insulation 
161 SF Install Ceiling insulation 
3 EA R/R Duplex outlets 
1 EA R/R 220 outlet 
1 EA Plumbing hook-ups 
1 EA Washer drain 
15.00 
.85 
.13 
.30 
.45 
75.00 
85.00 
48.00 
.90 
2.50 
.40 
.40 
.35 
.45 
.24 
.50 
20.00 
75.00 
50.00 
50.00 
285.00 
88. 40 
52.00 
120.00 
18o.00 
225.OO 
17".00 
48.0'.' 
144.?0 
402.5'"' 
64.40 
64 . 40 
56.3rL 
72.45 
3Q.64 
80. 50 
60.00 
75. 00 
50.00 
50. 00 
BATH (7)i 5J: 8) 
4 SY R/R Vinyl floor covering 
192 SF Seal coat wails 
192 SF Paint walls 
6 SF Paint bookcase 
1 EA R/R wood window unit 
35 SF Seal coat ceiling 
35 SF Paint Ceiling 
35 SF Clean ceiling 
2 LF Install standard base cabinets 
Remove standard base cabinets 
Install medicine cabinets 
LF 
EA 
EA 
EA 
EA 
Install 
Install 
Install 
Sink-
Commode 
Tub 
1 EA Remove/Reset Fixtures 
15.00 
.30 
.45 
.45 
75.00 
.35 
.45 
.15 
75.00 
5.00 
125.00 
125.00 
150.00 
225.00 
50. Ou 
6". 00 
57.60 
86.40 
2. 70 
75. UO 
12.25 
15.75 
5.2fj 
15".On 
10. OO 
125.00 
125.00 
150.00 
225.0c 
50. 00 
5. BREAU ROOM (10.08x10x8) w/ Offset (8.33x6.67) 
1? SY R/R Vinyl floor covering 
1 EA R/R Heating vents 
448 SF R/R Sheetrock 5/8 in. 
448 SF Clean walls 
448 SF Seal coat walls 
448 SF Paint walls 
1 EA R/R wood window unit 
5 EA Reglaze Windows 
157 SF Seal coat ceiling 
157 SF Paint Ceiling 
157 SF Clean ceiling 
2 EA R/R ceiling fixtures 
4 LF Remove standard base cabinets 
3 LF Remove standard wall cabinets 
4 LF Install standard base cabinets 
3 LF Install standard wall cabinets 
8 EA R/R Duple): outlets 
1 Repair Steps 
1 5 . 0 0 
2 3 . 0 0 
. 7 0 
. 13 
. 30 
. 4 5 
7 5 . 0 0 
3 5 . 00 
. 3 5 
. 4 5 
. 15 
7 5 . 0 0 
5 . 0 0 
5 . 0 0 
7 5 . 0 0 
7A. 00 
2 0 . 0 0 
5 0 . 0 0 
2 0 5 . t 
2 3 . 0 
3 1 3 . 6 
5 8 . 2 
1 3 4 . 4 
2 0 1 . 6 
7 5 . 0 
1 7 5 . 0 
5 4 . 7 
7 0 . 6 
2 3 . 5 
1 5 0 . O 
2 0 . " 
1 5 . 0 
3 0 0 . O1 
222 .0* 
1 6 0 . 'H 
5 0 . 0< 
6. REAR BATH (7.25x5.17x3) W/ Offset (3.33x2.5) 
6 SY R/R Vinyl floor covering 
240 SF Clean walls 
240 SF**£eal coat walls 
240 SF Paint walls 
1 EA Clean ?/ Adjust Window unit 
1 EA Reglaze Windows 
1 EA R/R door hardware 
46 SF Seal coat ceiling 
46 SF Paint Ceiling 
46 SF Clean ceiling 
1 EA R/R ceiling fixtures 
46 SF Remove batt insulation 
46 SF Install Ceiling insulation 
32 SF Repair sheetrocl. 
1 5 . 0 0 
. 13 
. 3 0 
. 4 5 
1 0 . 0 0 
3 5 . 0 0 
1 8 5 . 0 0 
. 3 5 
. 4 5 
. 15 
7 5 . 0 0 
. 2 4 
. 5 0 
. 9 5 
9 0 . 0' 
3 1 . 7 1 
7 2 . Ot 
1 0 0 . Ov 
1 0 . 0» 
3 5 . 0< 
1 8 5 . Ot. 
1 6 . K 
2 0 . 7 K 
6 . 7 i 
75.0*. 
1 1 . 04 
2 7 . 00 
3 0 . 4 0 
ROOF 
175 LF Rafter 2X4 
20 LF Remove ridge bar 
500 SF Remove roof plywood sheathing 
11 SD Install 240# comp. shingles 
5 SQ Install underlayment 
1 EA Swamp cooler and duct work 
210 SF Install lap cedar siding 
1.30 
.40 
75.00 
7.00 
1,295.00 
1.65 
227.5*1 
6.4o 
2u0.On 
825. <>u 
35. un 
1,295.On 
346.50 
3. MISC. 
8 Hr Remove S< return contents 
Debris removal 
Fumigate house 
Permits 
22. 00 
1., 200- 00 
250.00 
300.00 
176. yci 
1, 2U0.00 
25U.0O 
300.0u 
Material ?< Labor subtotal 
7. Contractor's Overhead 
7. Contractor's Profit 
20,640.55 
2,064.86 
2,271.:4 
TOTAL 24,9134.75 
